Public documents which have been introduced as exhibits not covered by retaining lien

Public documents which have been introduced as exhibits not covered by retaining lien

Legal Ethics Retaining Lien

The privilege of a retaining lien granted to an attorney does not cover papers and documents which are public in character and which have been introduced as exhibits. Such papers and documents are properly subject to the Court’s custody. In the case at bar, the intransigence of the petitioner in his persistence to continue in possession of the papers and documents in question based on his erroneous belief as to the extent of the privilege of a retaining lien, must not be accorded the imprimatur of the approval of this Tribunal. If such were not the law, the resulting injury to a fair and efficient administration of justice might well prove to be incalculable. Against such a deplorable consequence this Court must resolutely set its face. (Villanueva v. Querubin, G.R. No. L-26137. September 23, 1968)

Filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity

Filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity

Criminal Procedure

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(d)  That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. (Quisay v. People, G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016)

Cargoes, while being unloaded, generally remain under the custody of the carrier

Cargoes, while being unloaded, generally remain under the custody of the carrier

Transportation Law

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.

For marine vessels, Article 619 of the Code of Commerce provides that the ship captain is liable for the cargo from the time it is turned over to him at the dock or afloat alongside the vessel at the port of loading, until he delivers it on the shore or on the discharging wharf at the port of unloading, unless agreed otherwise. In Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Lopez Castelo, the Court interpreted the ship captain’s liability as ultimately that of the shipowner by regarding the captain as the representative of the shipowner.

Lastly, Section 2 of the COGSA provides that under every contract of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and immunities set forth in the Act. Section 3 (2) thereof then states that among the carriers’ responsibilities are to properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.

It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier x x x.

In Regional Container Lines (RCL) of Singapore v. The Netherlands Insurance Co. (Philippines), Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc., the Court echoed the doctrine that cargoes, while being unloaded, generally remain under the custody of the carrier. We cannot agree with Westwind’s disputation that "the carrier in Wallem clearly exercised supervision during the discharge of the shipment and that is why it was faulted and held liable for the damage incurred by the shipment during such time." What Westwind failed to realize is that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts until the time the goods are actually or constructively delivered by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. There is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods.16 In this case, since the discharging of the containers/skids, which were covered by only one bill of lading, had not yet been completed at the time the damage occurred, there is no reason to imply that there was already delivery, actual or constructive, of the cargoes to ATI. Indeed, the earlier case of Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Corp. serves as a useful guide, thus:

Delsan’s argument that it should not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to backflow because the same had already been actually and legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore tank holds no water. It had been settled that the subject cargo was still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging thereof has not yet been finished when the backflow occurred. Since the discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet been completed at the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred, there is no reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the cargo to the consignee. Delsan is straining the issue by insisting that when the diesel oil entered into the tank of Caltex on shore, there was legally, at that moment, a complete delivery thereof to Caltex. To be sure, the extraordinary responsibility of common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to a person who has the right to receive them. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk Depot has not yet been finished, Delsan still has the duty to guard and to preserve the cargo. The carrier still has in it the responsibility to guard and preserve the goods, a duty incident to its having the goods transported.

To recapitulate, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. The mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to the carrier, and their arrival in the place of destination in bad order, make out a prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss was due to accident or some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability. (Westwind Shipping v. UCPB, G.R. No. 200289, November 25, 2013)

Importance of pre-trial in civil actions

Importance of pre-trial in civil actions

Civil Procedure Pre-Trial

The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. 

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century," pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.34

Therefore, "pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. (Philam v. Enario, G.R. No. 182075, September 15, 2010)

Requisites of fortuitous event

Requisites of fortuitous event

Fortuitous event Transportation Law

● A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174 of the Civil Code. But while it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. Else stated, for a common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident due to its own or its employees' negligence. We explained in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., as follows:

In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, 

(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; 

(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; 

3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and 

(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. 

The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient. Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's attribution, as follows:

7. The Immediate and the Proximate Cause of the Sinking

The Captain's erroneous maneuvers of the MIV Princess of the Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It should be noted that during the first two hours when the ship left North Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards Limbones Point. During the same period, the ship was only subjected to the normal weather stress prevailing at the time. She was then inside Manila Bar. The waves were observed to be relatively small to endanger the safety of the ship. It was only when the MV Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while navigating towards the direction of the Fortune Island when this agonizing misfortune struck the ship.

Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the ship to her portside had continuously increased. It was at this point that the captain had misjudged the situation. While the ship continuously listed to her portside and was battered by big waves, strong southwesterly winds, prudent judgement [sic] would dictate that the Captain should have considerably reduced the ship's speed. He could have immediately ordered the Chief Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile, the winds and waves continuously hit the ship on her starboard side. The waves were at least seven to eight meters in height and the wind velocity was a[t] 25 knots. The MV Princess of the Orient being a close-type ship (seven decks, wide and high superstructure) was vulnerable and exposed to the howling winds and ravaging seas. Because of the excessive movement, the solid and liquid cargo below the decks must have shifted its weight to port, which could have contributed to the tilted position of the ship.

Minutes later, the Captain finally ordered to reduce the speed of the ship to 14 knots. At the same time, he ordered to put ballast water to the starboard-heeling tank to arrest the continuous listing of the ship. This was an exercise in futility because the ship was already listing between 15 to 20 degrees to her portside. The ship had almost reached the maximum angle of her loll. At this stage, she was about to lose her stability.

Despite this critical situation, the Captain executed several starboard maneuvers. Steering the course of the Princess to starboard had greatly added to her tilting. In the open seas, with a fast speed of 14 knots, advance maneuvers such as this would tend to bring the body of the ship in the opposite side. In navigational terms, this movement is described as the centripetal force. This force is produced by the water acting on the side of the ship away from the center of the turn. The force is considered to act at the center of lateral resistance which, in this case, is the centroid of the underwater area of the ship's side away from the center of the turn. In the case of the Princess, when the Captain maneuvered her to starboard, her body shifted its weight to port. Being already inclined to an angle of 15 degrees, coupled with the instantaneous movement of the ship, the cargoes below deck could have completely shifted its position and weight towards portside. By this time, the ship being ravaged simultaneously by ravaging waves and howling winds on her starboard side, finally lost her grip.

Even assuming the seaworthiness of the M/VPrincess of the Orient, the petitioner could not escape liability considering that, as borne out by the aforequoted findings of the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel had been the gross negligence of its captain in maneuvering the vessel.

The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal No. 1 during the time of the sinking.31 The BMI observed that a vessel like the M/V Princess of the Orient, which had a volume of 13.734 gross tons, should have been capable of withstanding a Storm Signal No. I considering that the responding fishing boats of less than 500 gross tons had been able to weather through the same waves and winds to go to the succor of the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of the latter's distressed passengers. (Sulpicio Lines v. Sesante, G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016)

● A common carrier is not liable for loss only when (1) the fortuitous event was the only and proximate cause of the loss and (2) it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss. The second element is absent here. As a common carrier, petitioner should have been more vigilant in monitoring weather disturbances within the country and their (possible) effect on its routes and destination. More specifically, it should have been more alert on the possible attenuating and dysfunctional effects of bad weather on the parts of the ship. It should have foreseen the likely prejudicial effects of the strong waves and winds on the ship brought about by inclement weather and should have taken the necessary precautionary measures through extraordinary diligence to prevent the weakening or dysfunction of the parts of the ship to avoid or prune down the loss to cargo. (Lea Mer Industries v. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 161745, September 30, 2005)

Taking an extension seat in a jeepney is not an implied assumption of risk on the part of the passenger

Taking an extension seat in a jeepney is not an implied assumption of risk on the part of the passenger

Contributory negligence Transportation Law

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. (Calalas v. CA, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000)

[The agreement of taking an extension seat in a jeepney is not an implied assumption of risk on the part of the passenger so as to exempt the transport company from liability for injuriess sustained. - Villanueva, Commercial Law Review]

Defenses available to the common carrier

Defenses available to the common carrier

Common carrier Transportation Law

Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and the safety of the passengers they transport, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy.  Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods entrusted for carriage and delivery.

Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have transported. This presumption can be rebutted only by proof that 

A.) they observed extraordinary diligence, or that 

B.) the loss or damage was occasioned by any of the following causes:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority. (Lea Mer Industries v. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 161745, September 30, 2005)